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GLOSSARY
Browser

Computer application that enables a user to interact with
websites through the HTTP protocol (Tilborg & Jajodia,
2011, p. 1372).

Broswer Artifact

Metadata created by web browsers, often stored in database
files, provides information about actions that have occured in
the web browser during a session, common examples include
cookies, cache, and history (McQuaid, 2014).

Browser Cache

“Folder of files or a database file where pages, images, applets,
and other data are stored from your web surfing sessions
(Stauffer & McElhearn, 2004, p. 344).”

Browser History

Stores information about web browser activities including
visited web pages (Sheldrake, 2011, p. 143).

Cybercrime

Computer crime in which a computer serves as a target of a
crime, an instrument of the crime, is incidental to a crime,
or the crime is “associated with the prevalence of computers”
(Reyes et al., 2007, p. 26).

Cyber Forensics

The process of extracting data and information from
computers to present as digital evidence in the court of law
(ISC, 2015).

File System

“The underlying structure a computer uses to organize data
on a hard disk (Microsoft, 2015a).”

ix
Internet Privacy

Issue that encompasses concerns regarding the collection
of personally identifiable information as well as being
electronically monitored by law enforcement, elmployers, etc
(Smith, 2007, p. 58).

Metadata

Data about data, such as creation, modification, and access
times of files (Lugmayr, Niiranen, & Kalli, 2004).

Operating System

“Software program that enables the computer hardware to
communicate with and operate the computer software (Hope,
2016).”

Private Browsing

Web browser mode in which information about visited
websites is not saved (Vermaat, Sebok, Freund, Campbell,
& Frydenberg, 2015).

Virtual Machine

“A virtual machine (VM) is an operating system OS or
application environment that is installed on software which
imitates dedicated hardware. (Rouse, 2014)”

x

ABSTRACT
Gabet, Ryan M. M.S., Purdue University, August 2016. A Comparative forensic
analysis of privacy enhanced web browsers. Major Professor: Kathryn C.
Seigfried-Spellar.
Growing concerns regarding Internet privacy has led to the development of
enhanced privacy web browsers. The intent of these web browsers is to provide
better privacy for users who share a computer by not storing information about
what websites are being visited as well as protecting user data from websites that
employ tracking tools such as Google for advertisement purposes. As with most
tools, users have found an alternative purpose for enhanced privacy browsers, some
illegal in nature. This research conducted a digital forensic examination of three
enhanced privacy web browsers and three commonly used web browsers in private
browsing mode to identify if these browsers produced residual browsers artifacts and
if so, if those artifacts provided content about the browsing session. The
examination process, designed to simulate common practice of law enforcement
digital forensic investigations, found that when comparing browser type by browser
and tool combination, out of a possible 60 artifacts, the common web browsers
produced 26 artifacts while the enhanced privacy browsers produced 25 for a difference
of 2%. The tool set used also had an impact in this study, with FTK finding a total of
28 artifacts while Autopsy found 23, for a difference of 8%. The conclusion of this
research found that although there was a difference in the number of artifacts produced
by the two groups of browsers, the difference was not significant to support the claim
that one group of browsers produced fewer browsers than the other. As this study has
implications for privacy minded citizens as well as law enforcement and digital forensic
practitioners concerned with browser forensics,

xi
this study identified a need for future research with respect to internet browser
privacy, including expanding this research to include more browsers and tools.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
In todays digital age, where personal privacy and web presence struggle to
converge at a reasonable common ground, increased public knowledge of possible
invasions of Internet privacy has sparked widespread discussion for more secure and
private web usage methods (Walters, 2015). Among the methods available to
increase personal privacy while browsing was the use of specific web browsers that
feature enhanced privacy features. Web browser developers have added
enhancements to enable private session browsing capabilities as a means to enhance
web anonymity and privacy for users. Giving users the capability to browse websites
without leaving traces behind on the computer, private session browsers do not
store web browser artifacts such as cookies, form data, or web page history entries
(Hoffman, 2012). While this capability has provided a sense of privacy for users
who work off of a shared computer such as a library, work, family, or school
computer, it continues to present a problem for digital forensic investigators. In
cases where private session browsing has been used for nefarious purposes, a lack of
browser metadata or typically stored content potentially inhibited the data
collection processes or caused issues for investigators as they tried to determine
what happened and who was responsible.

1.1 Scope
The scope of this reseach identified, recovered, and compared recoverable
web browser artifacts of three commonly used web browsers and three less
commonly used, enhanced privacy web browsers using software both available and
used by law enforcement agencies to conduct digital forensics examinations. This
reserach only investigated web browsers that were compatible with the Microsoft
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Windows 10 operating system, however one or more of the browsers used may be
compatible with previous versions of the Microsoft Windows OS as well as Apple
OS and various distributions of Linux OS. The tools within this scope of this
reserach were those available to law enforcement agencies for conducting a forensics
analysis of the files stored on hard disk and that have been used before to produce
admissible evidence in the Court of Law. The web browser artifacts within the
scope of this research were browser artifact files that are typically created by web
browsers to store information about visited websites, viewed content, and sent and
received digital communication.

1.2 Significance
The significance of this study not only benefited law enforcement involved in
the field of Cyber Forensics, but also, society in general as a contribution to the
discussion and pursuit of Internet privacy. With 269,422 formal complaints filed
with the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) (2014) in the year 2014,
increased complaints filed compared to the previous year suggested cybercrime was
on the rise. As cybercrime rates have rises and cybercriminals have become more
educated in methods of circumventing law enforcement detection, this research
served purposeful in identifying expected recoverable browser artifacts that have
been helpful to law enforcement in digital investigations to reveal nefarious
computer behavior such as content consistent with cybercrime, cyberstalking, or
viewed and shared child pornography (NW3C, 2009).
In a different discussion, Internet privacy and government surveillance has
sparked open discussion in regards to web browsing privacy. As more web browser
developers have provided methods of private web browsing, this research was
necessary to test the claims of privacy that web browser developers have made in
regards to private session browsing and enhanced privacy features. In addition, to
an increasingly privacy minded society, this research sought to identify whether
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enhanced privacy web browsers provided a higher level of privacy compared to the
anonymous browsing modes of common browsers based on recovered browser
artifacts.

1.3 Research Question
From a web browser artifact forensics standpoint, do the enhanced privacy
web browsers Epic, Comodo Dragon, or Dooble produce fewer browser artifacts and
content than the private browsing mode of the common web browsers Chrome,
Firefox, or Edge?

1.4 Assumptions
The assumptions for this study included:
• Additional artifacts may have been created by the process of downloading
each web browser.
• Not every web browser action was found as content in a recovered browser
artifact.
• The findings of this reserach were only representative of this test methodology
including the operating system, file system, browser environment, and analysis
tools, including version numbers, used in this research.
• All eleven lab machines used to process and analyze browser data were
identical systems with identical software installed.
• Each Windows environment had only one user account.
• The CFFTPM forensic framework used to conduct the forensic examination in
this methodology would generate admissble evidence in the court of law.
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• Per the CFFTPM forensic framework, phases Planning and Triage have
already occured, the Usage/User Profiles phase was skipped because only one
user account exists, Chronology/Timeline was skipped because time stamps
were not necessary for this research, and the study began with the Internet
investigation phase.
• The system analyzed in this study was powered off when obtained, prior to
imaging and conducting analysis.

1.5 Limitations
The limitations for this study included:
• Due to software licensing availability and cost of software licenses, only the
commercial forensics software Access Forensic Toolkit was available for use in
this methodology.
• Due to large data processing time requirement of the forensic tools used,
eleven different machines running the same version of the tools were used for
data collection and analysis.
• Some artifact files produced by the forensic tools used, required additional
tools to be read and viewed, resulting in the contents remaining unknown.
• Each browser may have stored data differently including the location, file
name, and content type stored in the form of artifacts.
• Additional browser artifacts or content may have existed within the file
system in places other than the known artifact files and locations.
• Due to time contraints, only six browsers and two tools were used in the
methodology of this research.
• The order in which the browser traffic was created was intentional.
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• The same data processing actions were not carried out on every browser in
each tool as both tools provided additional data processing actions for
supported web browsers. Supported web browsers were typically Internet
Explorer, Google Chrome, and Mozilla Firefox.
• The generated web traffic only contained ten different web sites and fewer
email, video, and instant massaging sites for data population. Varying web
sites, email service poviders, and instant messaging services may produce
recoverable artifacts other than what is found in this research.
• Other tools and methods exist besides those used in this research methodology
to create virtual machines and create disk images.
• Due to lack of documented research on browser artifacts files and locations for
Comodo Dragon, Epic, and Dooble browser, the closest browser with
documented artifact file and location documentation had to be used. In the
case of Comodo Dragon and Epic, the same artifact names and locations as
Chrome were used as both browsers are based off of the Chromium open
source browser platform thus were expected to be similar to Chrome. Dooble
browser was not based off of any one particular browser, therefore artifacts
were searched for in the Dooble Browser application files, similar to Firefox,
Chrome, and Microsoft Edge.
• The forensic examination was a local examination, meaning only information
stored locally on the computer hard disk, or in this case, the VM disk, was
examined.

1.6 Delimitations
The delimitations for this study included:
• Only browsers compatible with the Microsoft Windows OS environment,
specifically Windows 10 were used in this research.
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• Apple computers running the Macintosh OS or computers that used
distrubutions of the Linux OS were not examined in this study as they require
the use of different file systems.
• This study did not examine web browsers that used proxy servers or the TOR
network to enhance privacy.
• The proxy tool built into Epic was disabled prior to the data population
process.
• Due to the fact that each image contained in excess of 180,000 files or
viewable items, this research methodology only looked for known documented
artifact files in their expected locations.
• As a substitute for the commercial forensic analysis software EnCase due to
unavailability of a software license, the open source Autopsy forensics analysis
program was used as the second tool of analysis.
• This research only used Gmail and Yahoo mail to send and receive emails to
generate email artifacts.
• This research only used Youtube to watch video content.
• This research only used the Google and Yahoo search engines to search the
search terms.
• All browser data collection and analysis was conducted post-session, meaning
the browser session was closed prior to imaging and analysis.
• FTK and Autopsy were used in their stock condition, meaning no additional
plugins were installed or used for data processing.
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1.7 Summary
This chapter provided the scope, significance, research question,
assumptions, limitations, and delimitations of this research. The purpose of this
chapter was to state the main object of this research in the form of a research
question as well as provide a more detailed frame of the research to be conducted
including a description of the intended outcome of of this research, what was done,
what was not done, any assumptions made and possible flaws that existed in this
research. For this research, the purpose was to identify if enhanced privacy web
browsers produced fewer recoverable web browser artifacts than common web
browsers in their respective private browsing modes. Primary confines of this
research included three common web browsers and three enhanced privacy web
browsers that were all compatible with Microsoft Windows 10; analyzed with two
tools used by law enforcement agencies to conduct a forensic analysis of a raw disk
image, including the abilitiy to access the entire file system of the forensic image to
search for specifically documented artifact files in specific locations.
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CHAPTER 2. REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE
This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to Internet privacy,
enhanced privacy web browsers, digital forensics tools, digital forensic frameworks,
and research methodologies of similar studies.

2.1 Foundations of Digital Evidence and Cybercrime
Following the dawn of the information age, digital evidence has become an
integral part of modern crime scene investigations. In high profile cases such as the
BTK killer Dennis Rader, Scott Peterson, and David Leslie Fuller, digital evidence
provided the necessary proof to convict each of murder among other charges (Ritter,
2006). Defined in the 2004 NIJ report, the term digital evidence is defined as
“information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in court”
(of Justice, 2004). Broad in nature, by this definition, all digital devices can be
identified as digital evidence in an investigation. Even though the crimes committed
in the above examples did not occur in cyber space, the digital evidence showing
how the crimes were carried out, proved to be key evidence needed to secure a
conviction. INTERPOL (2015) noted a distinction used by law enforcement to
classify cybercrime into two categories, advanced cybercrime and cyber-enabled
crime. By this definition, advanced cybercrime was described as sophistocated
attacks that target computer hardware and software, while cyber-enabled crime
described crime where technology and the Internet was used in some part of the
process of committing a crime, such as crimes against children, financial crimes, and
terrorism (INTERPOL, 2015). In the cases of Dennis Rader, Scott Peterson, and
David Leslie Fuller, digital evidence revealed information about how each crime, in
these three instances murder, was carried out. In the case of Casey Anthony
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however, inaccurate tools and poor attention to detail in the investigation caused
the technicians conducting the investigation to miss key evidence including key
Internet search terms like “foolproof suffocation,” which Anthony supposedly used
to murder her two year old daughter (Goodison, Davis, & Jackson, 2015). These
cases have demonstrated just how important digital evidence has become in today’s
criminal investigations, whether it reveals who committed the crime, where or how
the crime occured, or how the suspect met the victim.

2.2 Internet Privacy and Concerns
Among the hotly contested debate surrounding the idea of Internet privacy,
from a legal perspective is the concept of right to privacy on the internet (Bernal,
2014). In the post 9/11 era, where government surveillance has become an
increasingly debated topic as a means to thwart foreign and domestic terror plots,
differencing opinions among the American people as to whether government
surveillance is a necessary precaution to thwart terrorism or whether it is an
violation of privacy, has become a bipartisan political issue (G. Gao, 2015). In a
2015 poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, 87% of the poll participants said
they were aware of government surveillance programs put in place following the
September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center; of those, a reported 25%
admitted to changing the way they use technology (G. Gao, 2015). Among poll
respondents, 18% reported changing their use of email accounts, while 17% changed
their use of search engines, and 15% changed their use of social media sites (G. Gao,
2015). While this poll only questioned changed usage patterns on computers with
respect to email accounts, search engines, and social media sites, the previously
mentioned statistics noted changes in technology usage, primarily with regards to
the way technology and Internet accounts are used, thus supported that Internet
privacy is a growing concern of society, especially with respect to government
surveillance.
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To further focus on how web browsers are being used to enhance user privacy
against prying eyes, the researchers, Gao, Yang, Fu, Lindqvist, and Wang (2014)
conducted a survey to identify the general populations understanding of private
browsing. The term private browsing defined as a “web browser mode in which
information about visited websites is not saved” (Vermaat et al., 2015). The survey
created by the researchers was hosted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, surveyed 200
participants in the United States, and included multiple choice and open ended
questions that were designed to identify what browsers are used the most, what
participants knew about private browsing, and whether or not they felt “private
browsing” was a useful tool to have (X. Gao et al., 2014). From their survey
responses, the researchers found that Chrome had the most users (48.5% of the 200
participants) as well as highest percentage of users that knew about private
browsing (76% knowing about private browsing) (X. Gao et al., 2014). Chrome was
closely followed by Firefox, and Internet Explorer, whereas Opera and Safari had
few users and even fewer with knowledge of private browsing (X. Gao et al., 2014).
Other questions that were asked in the survey include; “Why do you use
InPrivate (Private, or Incognito) browsing?”, “When do you use InPrivate (Private,
or Incognito) browsing?”’, “Are there any benefits of using private browser?”, and
“Are there any drawbacks of using private browsing?” (X. Gao et al., 2014). It
should first be noted that when using the terms InPrivate, Private, and Incognito
that the authors were refering to the same thing; the private browsing mode in each
browser, differenciated for browser names sake. The answers to these questions
supplied both qualitative and quantitative data for the researchers study. Of the 81
participants out of 200 who stated they used a private browsing mode, 39.5% said
the reason they did so was, so their browser would not store cookies or web history
entries, followed by protecting personal information at 22.2%, followed by visiting
dating or pornography web sites at 11.1% (X. Gao et al., 2014). The poll to
identify when people used private browsing returned fairly consistent numbers
throughout the entire day with 21% in the morning before work, 28.4% using at
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work, 39% at night after work, and 28.4% late at night after11pm (X. Gao et al.,
2014). In their comparison of the leading benefits and drawbacks, 59.3% identified
the key benefit of private browsing as no stored browsing history while 46.9%
identified the key drawback of private browsing was there are no drawbacks (X. Gao
et al., 2014). Although this study invloved surveys from 200 participants, when
asked what people understand about private browsing, 79% were able to provide an
opinion or thought with regards to the idea of private browsing while 21% replied
that they “didn’t know” (X. Gao et al., 2014). Of the 158 out of 200 participants
who were able to provide an opinion or thought regarding private browsing, 135
knew about private browsing, but only 81 of the 135 had actually used private
browsing. The outcome of this study supports that Internet privacy has become an
a growing topic of discussion with some people even taking proactive steps to
acheive better privacy when using the Internet.

2.3 Web Browser Artifacts
In their paper on software artifacts, authors Gupta and Mehtre (2013,
p. 303) defined the term web artifacts as a “kind of by-products produced during
installation and/or use of software products.” Although their paper focused
primarily on the broad term “software forensics,” Gupta and Mehtre discussed in
depth, the significance of forensic artifacts (2013). They began by discussing areas
of interest on the HDD during forensic investigations, noting
HKEY CURRENT USER as the registry location where programs, desktop settings,
network connections, printers, and application preferences were found (Gupta &
Mehtre, 2013). The primary items of interest found in this registry were program
data and application settings as they will told what programs were recently
executed, uninstalled, files recently saved or downloaded, and where software resided
in the file system (Gupta & Mehtre, 2013). Of particular interest to the research of
this thesis work is the mention of the AppData folder that can be found in newer
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versions of Microsoft, as was said to contain specific artifacts such as program
settings, IE cookies, toolbar settings, browsing history, tempory files created by
applications, library, send to items, and templates among other items (Gupta &
Mehtre, 2013). The information regarding browser artifacts in this paper provided a
good starting point for understanding where and how to search for browser artifacts.

2.4 Research Methodology of Similar Studies
To identify what research has already been done to test the the claims of
enhanced privacy made by browser developers, the following literature reports on
methodologies to test the effectiveness of web browsers that claim to have improved
privacy, while also identifying where gaps in research exist.
In his research, Noorulla conducted research to test the claims of anonymity
of private Web browser modes (2014). Focused on four widely used and well-known
web browsers (Internet Explorer, Firefox, Chrome, and Safari) he designed a
methodology that included a two part test. The first test involved monitoring the
file system for changes made as a result of operating in the private mode of each
browser (Noorulla, 2014). For the second test, Noorulla conducted a memory dump
of the system after finishing operating in the private browser mode of each browser
(Noorulla, 2014). Since files can be written and altered in the file system, memory,
or both, Noorulla’s methodology was tailored to address all three scenarios to
ensure that nothing was missed. In his results, Noorulla found that when looking at
the changes made to the file system, only Chrome and Firefox did not write any
changes to the file system, whereas Safari wrote data to a single database file called
WebpageIcons.db, and Internet Explorer wrote data to the file system but then
deleted it (Noorulla, 2014). Looking at the results from the second test, Noorulla
found that all browsers left recoverable browser artifacts in memory (Noorulla,
2014). With respect to future research, Noorulla identifed three areas that require
more research; those being the effectiveness of browser data eraser software, further

13
analysis of other browsers, and analysis of browsers designed for mobile devices
(Noorulla, 2014).
Research by Marrington, Baggili, Ismail, and Al Kaf (2012) investigated
portable web browsers from a forensic investigation perspective. In their study, they
posed the research question “Do portable web browsers leave similar forensic
artifacts to those left by installed web browsers?” (Marrington et al., 2012). The
methodology used by the researchers to investigate the posed question involved
creating three similar web browsing sessions, one in the installed version of Google
Chrome, one in the portable version of Google Chrome, and one in the portable
version of Google Chrome in Incognito mode (Marrington et al., 2012). Once the
session data was created, analysis and comparison of the artifacts left behind on the
host computer lead to the determination of which instance of Chrome left the
smallest forensic footprint on the host computer. In their results, the researchers
asserted that using a portable version of Chrome still left artifacts on the computer
hard drive even after the USB drive containing the portable instance of Chrome had
been removed, thus being able to state that portable browsers did not provide a
viable solution to better browsing privacy (Marrington et al., 2012). Future
research suggested by the researchers involved conducting a similar test on other
popular portable web browsers such as Opera and Firefox.
In research conducted by Aggarwal, Bursztein, Jackson, and Boneh (2010),
they investigated the usage patterns of private browsing modes and the level of
security these browsers provide for the user. As part of their research, Aggarweal et
al., provided a definition for their usage of the phrase “goals of private browsing,”
that being to protect users from local attackers and to protect the user from web
attacks (2010). Their methodology used a technique that used ads and ad-networks
to generate traffic that was used to determine if the users navigating to the ads were
using a private browsing mode or not and to identify usage patterns for private
browsing modes (Aggarwal et al., 2010). For this study, the four widely used web
browsers (Firefox, Safari, Chrome, and Internet Explorer) were used. In their
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results, the researchers found that private browsing was used mostly for browsing
shopping websites and adult websites (those characterized as websites hosting
pornographic or other explicit material). Additional findings provided that in terms
of security, browser addons and extensions pose potential security risks such as URL
whitelist/blocklist/queues, URL mapping, and timestamp storage; all of which can
store unwanted browser artifacts (Aggarwal, et al., 2010). Future research identified
by the researchers included more research into how to build stronger security
measures to maximize user security without degrading the user experience
(Aggarwal et al., 2010).
In Gritzalis’ paper (2004) about Web privacy, he employed an integrated
comparison framework to compare various Web anonymity enhancing security
mechanisms, tools, applications, and services. In his research, Gritzalis compared
GNUnets Anonymity Protocol (GAP), Freedom, Hordes, Crowds, Onion Routing,
Platform for Privacy Preferences (P3P), TRUSTe, Lucent Personalized Web
Assistant (LPWA), and Anonymizer (2004). While his work did not discuss the use
of private browser modes, this fairly dated research provides evidence that increased
awareness for Web anonymity has resulted in increased development of methods of
achieving Web anonymity. The methodology used by Gritzalis for his study involved
laying out in detail how each anonymity solution worked at the architectural level,
then conducted a comparison of the features (2004). As this study was a
comparison, their results identified the pros and cons of each anonymity solution but
did not specifically say which was the best solution. Future research proposed by
Gritzalis included conducting more research into identifying features that have not
been implemented yet to provide better security and anonymity (Gritzalis, 2004)
In the study done by Said, Mutawa, Al Awadhi, and Guimaraes (2011), the
researchers analyzed the browsers Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Chrome in private
browsing mode using FTK Imager Lite, Winhex, EnCase, and cache and history
viewers to locate browser artifacts as if the investigation were for a criminal case.
The goal of this study was to identify whether or not artifacts from private browsing
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sessions can be recovered in the case of a criminal investigation. The methodology
used by the researchers involved setting up three identical workstations, each with
one of the three browsers installed. In each web browser, web traffic was generated
in a private browsing mode unique to each work station as to prevent
cross-contamination of data. Using the tools FTK Imager Lite, Winhex, EnCase,
cache, and history viewers, an image of the physical memory and hard disk was
captured followed by an examination of each instance for browser artifacts. The
findings of this study asserted that based on the artifacts that were recovered and
the processes necessary to recover those artifacts, private browsing mode offered a
level of privacy that is “sufficient for the average user” such that the average user
more than likely would not be able to find traces of their web traffic. However,
someone with more technical knowledge or a more advanced toolset may still be
able to recover artifacts from well-known places where artifacts are stored (Said et
al., 2011). The researchers concluded that of the three, Chrome does the best job
at hiding artifacts or rendering them unrecoverable. While this study focused on
browser history artifacts, the researchers suggested more research into this process
with other artifacts such as cookies, certificates, form passwords, and flash cookies
(Said et al., 2011).
A similar study by Mahendrakar, Irving, and Patel (2012) investigated
artifacts stored in physical memory by private browsing modes of various popular
web browsers. In their methodology, the researchers created a website that would
generate the following browser artifacts: SSL certificates, form passwords, form text
entries, HTML files up to 16MB in size, JPEG files ranging between 100KB and
16MB in size, and cookies (Mahendrakar et al., 2012). VMware Workstation was
used to host a Windows XP SP2 machine that was used for the research, giving the
researchers the ability to snapshot the machine before the test, after navigating to
the page, and again after closing the browser (Mahendrakar et al., 2012). The tool
Memory Parser was used to analyze the memory snapshots captured providing the
data for this study. The results of this study showed that when looking at browser
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memory, in Firefox, Internet Explorer, and Chrome, some artifacts existed but the
content in memory had been zeroed while Safari had not zeroed any of the content
in browser memory. When looking at the full memory dump for each browser, many
more artifacts were recoverable in all four browsers.
The researchers Satvat, Forshaw, Hao, and Toreini (2014) attempted to
identify security holes in private browsing modes of common browsers. In their
study, the researchers conducted a “from all angles” assessment of private browsing
mode security (Satvat et al., 2014). As with much of the already discussed research
work, Forshaw et al., populated Firefox, Chrome, Internet Explorer, and Safari with
known browser data then analyzed an image of the memory and hard disk to search
for recoverable artifacts. Tools used for setup and analysis in this study included
VMware Player, WinHex, Index.dat Analyser, SQLite browser, and SQLite
manager. The researchers in this study cited Aggarwal et al, 2010 in their definition
of the threat model, that of being a local attacker versus remote attacker but they
further defined each category to improve the Aggarwal et al. definition (2014).
Forshaw et al., found similar results to Aggarwal et al., in that a large majority of
security vulnerabilities were caused by browser extensions that make it possible for
attackers to gather information about the private browser session. Future work
highlighted by this study acknowledged an urgent need for a more systematic
approach to design, implementation, and testing of private browser features (2014).
From a different perspective, researchers Xu, Jang, Xing, Kim, and Lee
(2015) adopted a problem solving ideology to their research about a program called
Ucognito. Their preliminary research identified issues and inadequacies with the
current major browsers’ private browsing modes much like the research of Aggarwal
et al.(2010) and Forshaw et al.(2014) but Xu et al.(2015) proposed a solution
instead of simply identifying a problem. Contributions made by Xu et al. were the
tools UVerifier and UCognito, which were proposed to help identify security
weaknesses in private browsers as well as provide added security and setting
functionality for common browsers (2015). UVerifier is an automated tool designed
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to identify browser security flaws while UCognito was designed to provide a better
private browsing experience by utilizing a filesystem sandboxing feature that, in a
nutshell, makes the browser think it is interacting with the computer’s actual
filesystem as it stores artifacts (Xu et al., 2015). Through implementation and
evaluation, the researchers reported, “When applied to Chrome or Firefox,
[UCognito] stops all known privacy leaks identified by prior work and our current
study” (Xu et al., 2015, p. 11).
In their 2015 paper, researchers Ruiz, Amatte, Park, and Winter (2015)
explored a method to capture data that had been created in a private browser.
Contrary to much of the previously reviewed literature, this research did not seek to
identify issues with private browsing modes or test the anonymity of private
browsers. Instead this research identified a process for collecting artifacts that
would disprove the alleged privacy of browser vendors (Ruiz et al., 2015). If
successful, the process would have served as a method for assessment and validation
of private browser techniques (Ruiz et al., 2015). The methodology that Amatte et
al. used tested the browsers Internet Explorer 10, Firefox version 24, Google
Chrome version 30, and Safari version 5 on a virtual machine using a four part test.
The test SFKP is an acronym for the following; S for shutdown, F for freeze, K for
kill process, and P for power down. Each of these tests involved generating specific
browser data then capturing an image of the virtual machine at a different state to
see what happened to the artifacts and if they could be recovered. The results of
this study showed that during different machine states, different artifacts were
recoverable from each browser. The researchers concluded from this study that the
privacy that is being guaranteed in private browsers by browser vendors is not
actually being delivered, presenting a much larger problem in a society where web
privacy is becoming a large demand (Ruiz et al., 2015).
Applying an industry standard tool, Ohana and Shashidhar (2013) examined
private web browsers with the widely used tool Forensic Toolkit by Access Data.
Unlike many of the methodologies discussed thus far, the use of FTK is the most
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likely methodology, discussed in this review, to be used by law enforcement agencies
to conduct web browser forensics. Access Data’s Forensic Toolkit is among the
industry standards for court-cited digital forensic software, recieving the 2015 SC
Magazine Award for Best Computer Forensic Solution, and is used by more than
130,000 law enfocement, government, corporation, and law firm teams and agencies
world wide (AccessData, 2015). As with the other methodologies discussed so far,
Ohana and Shashidhar (2013) examined and analyzed the common web browsers
Chrome, Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Safari in their private browsing modes to
identify what artifacts could be identified, and if so, what artifacts could be
recovered, and ultimately attempted to determine which browser provides the
highest level of privacy. In their methodology, each browser was launched in a
virtual machine then a series of documented steps were carried out to generate web
browser session data (Ohana & Shashidhar, 2013). Next, the process tree for each
browser was closed to ensure the browser fully shut down, the researchers performed
a RAM dump using FTK Imager Lite to create an image file to analyze, then each
RAM dump was then analyzed in FTK v3.2 and the results documented (Ohana &
Shashidhar, 2013). Ohana and Shashidhar (2013) concluded in their findings that
all of the private browsers generated recoverable artifacts, although some were easier
to establish a link to the user than others. In addition, they concluded that
although not always possible for forensic examiners, the best chance of recovering
browser artifacts comes from looking at RAM (Ohana & Shashidhar, 2013)

2.5 Tools of Forensic Analysis
In a series of reports on the Department of Homeland Security’s website, the
results of NIST tool tests are published for the following categories: deleted file
recovery and active file listing, digital data acquisition, forensic media preparation,
graphic file carving, harware write block, mobile device acquisition, software write
block, and video file carving (NIST, 2015b). For the research being done in this
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thesis work, the tools tested for deleted file recovery and active file listing is of
particular interest and include ILookIX v2.2.3.151, The Sleuth Kit/Autopsy
v3.2.2/2.24, X-Ways Forensics v16.0 SR-4, SMART for Linux v2011-02-02, EnCase
Forensic v6.18.0.59, and FTK v3.3.0.33124 (NIST, 2015b). The NIST CFTT
project adds an extra layer of validation for the tools tested by focusing on
repeatability and reproductability, both of which are of great importance for law
enforcement agencies that my produce digital evidence in the court of law (Holt,
Bossler, & Seigfried-Spellar, 2015). As stated in their book authors Holt, Bossler,
and Seigfried-Spellar (2015) note that a great deal of importance should be placed
upon validation of digital forensic tools, especially when the used by law
enforcement. This idea is reaffirmed by Kanellis, Kiountouzis, Kolokotronis, and
Martakos (2006) in their book where they discuss in great detail the importance of
the validation process for digital forensic tools and the danger of using tools that
have not been properly validated.

2.6 Summary
This chapter provided a review of the literature relevant to Internet privacy,
methodologies of similar studies, and discussed tools that have been used in the past
to conduct similar studies. These subtopics were discussed to build a legal case for
the research to be conducted. As discussed in the early studies, post 9/11 politics
have prompted the growth of government surveillance programs as well as sparked
debate over the legality of government surveillance and the subject of Internet
privacy as a whole. Where the previous studies reviewed in this chapter focused
primarily on recovering browser artifacts from Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer,
and Safari in both their normal mode and their private browsing mode. All of these
studies neglected to analyze less popular web browsers with better privacy built into
them by default. The research in this chapter also failed to conduct comparisons
between common web browsers and less popular, enhanced privacy browsers. The
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tools identified in the above reviewed literature provide various degrees of data
processing, from database viewers to full access to the file system and deleted
content.
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CHAPTER 3. FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY
The research discussed in the above reviewed liturature focused on the four
most widely used desktop web browsers for the year 2015: Google Chrome
(53.95%), Microsoft Internet Explorer (19.38%), Mozilla Firefox (17.58%), and
Safari (5.03%) as identified by real time, global stat tracking web page
gs.statcounter.com (2016). Where previous research methodologies above explored
different methods to recover and analyze browser artifacts from the four most
common browsers, little to no research has been completed to compare the
improved privacy features of third party web browsers to the private browsing mode
of the four most widely used web browsers. The research completed in this thesis
work addressed this research gap by attempting to recover and analyze browser
artifacts from the three, common to Windows web browsers: Google Chrome,
Microsoft Edge, the replacement for Internet Explorer in Windows 10, and Mozilla
Firefox, and did the same for three third party, enhanced privacy web browser to
conduct a comparison. This comparison was designed to assess the advancement in
browser privacy by comparing the analysis of the enhanced privacy browsers to the
three common browsers running in private browsing mode to determine whether
enhanced privacy browsers provided better privacy or if the industry standards are
caught up in terms of privacy features.

3.1 Research Framework
The general framework for this research established the experimental
conditions for conducting the collection of information and artifacts from enhanced
privacy web browsers (i.e. Epic, Dooble, and Comodo Dragon) and private browsing
modes of common web browsers (i.e. Chrome, Edge, and Firefox) that were
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analyzed and compared for results. Several forensic investigation models existed to
guide investigators through the investigation process including how evidence is
collected, preserved, verified, examined, analyzed, and reported. For this study, the
Computer Forensics Field Triage Process Model served as the forensic analysis
framework and basic guide for the investigation process of Internet-based evidence.
Although several models looked similar, the CFFTP model included a more detailed
phase in particular to Internet-based evidence, containing three subphases: browser
artifacts, e-mail artifacts, and instant message artifacts (Rogers, Goldman, Mislan,
Wedge, & Debrota, 2006). Many other models did not go into detail to specifically
address Internet-based evidence in the investigation phase and thus, were not as
well-suited for this research methodology.

3.2 Study Design
As a case study of applied forensic process to Internet web browsers, the
research conducted was both qualitative and quantitative in nature and sought to
identify, recover, and view the content of web browser artifacts from prepopulated,
known web browser traffic. The browser artifact files and the contents of these files
provided the basis for analysis and measurement. The focus of this research design
was to conduct a case study of enhanced privacy and common web browsers in
private browsing mode, in which recoverable browser artifact files served as evidence
to answer the research question of this study, in particular, identifying which
browsers produced fewer recoverable artifacts, and as a result, provide better
privacy.
To address answering the research question, this reserach methodology
conducted a forensics analysis of three enhanced privacy web browsers and three
common web browsers in private browsing mode, using two different forensic
analysis tools for analyzing entire disk images and file systems. Prior to analyzing
the browsers, each browser was populated with known browser traffic, designed to
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generate ten different types of browser artifacts. Following browser data population,
the browser window was closed, the VM was saved, shut down and imaged using
FTK Imager. Once imaged, the image file was loaded into each tool and the data
was processed. For each browser, additional reseach of published white papers and
research studies provided a list of artifact file names and locations for each artifact
of each browser. Then a baseline was created for each browser by searching all of
the locations for the artifact files as identified in the previous research. Following
creating the baselines, ten trials were conducted by processing the baseline image on
ten separate machines containing the same OS and tools. Each trial was compared
tothe baseline for test-restest repeatability. The ten trials served to test the tools for
reliability, while using two tools served as a reliability test of this methodology.
Data collection included counts of each recovered artifact file as well as categorizing
each artifact into a matrix under one of three categories: File Present with Content,
File Present with No Content Present, and File Present Required Tools. Two forms
of data collection allowed for both quanitative and qualitative analysis. For
quantitative data analysis, means for each browser, by artifact, were calculated to
conduct an ANOVA to compare the means of the two groups of browsers. These
findings where then used to report the findings of this study.

3.3 Hypothesis
H: The enhanced privacy browsers Epic, Comodo Dragon, or Dooble
produced fewer browser artifacts than the common web browsers Chrome, Edge, or
Firefox in private browsing mode, thus providing a higher degree of privacy.

3.4 Software and Software Versions
Table 3.1 contains a list of all software and version numbers used in this
research.
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Table 3.1:
Software and Version Numbers
Software

Version

Virtual Box
Windows 10 Enterprise 64-bit

5.0.16
10.0 (build 10240)

FTK Imager

3.4.0.5

FTK

5.3.3.9

Autopsy

4.0

Microsoft Edge

20.10240.16384.0

Google Chrome

50.0.2661.102m

Mozilla Firefox

45.0.2

Epic

48.0.2553.0

Comodo Dragon

45.9.12.393

Dooble

1.56

SPSS
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3.5 Experiment Processes
This section listed in detail each process that was foregone to conduct this
research methodology. In this section, more detail was provided for each process
described in the study design, including VM configuration, selection of browsers,
selection of tools, data population, imaging, data processing, and data collection.

3.5.1 VM Configuration
Oracle Virtual Box v.5.0.16 was used to replicate a Microsoft Windows 10
environment as it is quicker to set up than an actual Windows environment on a
physical hard drive. Virtual Box was choosen in part because it is open-source
software and is free for use. Unlike VM Ware, a non-free virtual environment
software, Virtual Box can store the virtual instance of an operating system
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environment as a virtual hard disk file, which can easily be mounted in FTK Imager
as a logical drive and imaged for analysis. The use of virtual environment software
provided an efficient and free method of creating multiple instances of an OS
environment without needing additional hardware such as disk drives. In this
methodology, one virtual machine was created with the specifications below, then
cloned five times to ensure the identical environment was used. Each VM was then
booted and had one of each browser installed.
VM Configuration:
• Processor: 2 Processors
• Memory: 4 GB
• Storage: 14 GB
• VM File Format: Virtual Hard Disk (VHD)
• OS: Microsoft Windows 10 Enterprise 64-bit Build 10240
• Windows Install Type: Windows Custom Install (Windows file ONLY)
• Computer Name: (1 of 6 browsers)
• Installed browser: (1 of 6 browsers)
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3.5.2 Browser Selection
This section discussesed the web browsers that were used in this
methodology and why they were chosen for use in this methodology.

3.5.2.1. Enhanced Privacy Web Browsers

The research methodology of this thesis work tested common web browsers
as well as third party web browsers designed with privacy and anonymity in mind,
to compare to the common web browsers using anonymous browsing mode. As such,
the method for choosing the web browsers to be used was based upon open source
research via Google search to identify three privacy enhanced browsers, based on
how likely someone would be to find one of the browsers by perfoming a Google
search for the key terms “private browser,” “secret browser,” or “anonymous
browser.” One stipulation, as listed in the delimitations section, was the exclusion
of any browser that used the Tor network or proxy servers, as those browsers
employ network-based solutions to increase privacy was not part of this research
methodology.
In a TechWorld online article on the top secure web browsers of 2015, the
three highest rated enhanced privacy web browsers are Epic Browser, Comodo
Dragon browser, and Dooble browser (Dunn, 2015). As stated by in the article,
Epic Browser, based on Chromium, achieved better privacy by striping out many of
the features which populate browser artifacts (Dunn, 2015). While Epic Browser
was said to route searches through a proxy server belonging to the company that
developed it, Epic did not rely on proxy server, therefore is allowable for the
research methodology of this thesis work (Dunn, 2015). In addition to anonymous
searching, Epic browser was also said to eliminate cookies and trackers at the end of
each session in addition to not collecting any user data during the session (Dunn,
2015). Comodo Dragon browser was similar as it was a Chromium-based web
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browser, but functioned differently from Epic in that it includes “SecureDNS”
servers which could be used to bypass ISP infrastructure as well as a “virtualised
mode” which was said to isolate the browser from the host system (Dunn, 2015).
The third highest rated browser according to techworld.com was Dooble browser
which featured the default use of secure HTTP and included encryption methods for
bookmarks, browsing preferences, and history (Dunn, 2015).
Another blog about private web browsers again, rated Epic Browser and
Comodo Dragon among the top enhanced privacy web browsers (Henry, 2014).
Although Dooble browser was not listed on as many blogs and pages as Epic and
Comodo Dragon, it was among the few private browsers found that did not use
proxy servers or the Tor network. Additionally, among the top results during the
google search was the home page for Comodo Dragon and Epic Browser.
One piece of verbage of importance to note during this search is the
distinction between secure browsers and private browsers. Some browsers were listed
as being more secure, often stating they did not store or allow tracking cookies, had
built in malware protection, blocked advertisements, and did not allow certain
plug-ins such as Java and Flash, which have a long history of presenting security
vulnerabilities (Zaharia, 2015). For the research being conducted in this thesis
work, these browsers were not of interest as the research focused on local artifacts,
not those that would make a user identifiable by a website or server. Browsers that
were listed as private browsers included features similar to what can be seen in
Internet Explorer’s InPrivate browsing mode as well as similar browsers such as
Chrome and Firefox, where potential artifacts such as cookies, temporary Internet
files, webpage history, form data, and more is not stored or is created but deleted
upon ending the browser session (Microsoft, 2015b). As the research in this thesis
work sought to conduct a comparison of enhanced privacy web browsers and
common web browsers in anonymous browsing mode to determine whether
enhanced privacy browsers provide better privacy, private browsers are the types of
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web browsers that were included in the research methodology as enhanced privacy
browsers.

3.5.2.2. Common Web Browsers with Private Browsing Mode

This research compared enhanced privacy web browsers with common web
browsers in private browsing mode as the primary objective. As such, the common
web browsers with private browsing modes were selected from a monthly online poll
of the most commonly used web browsers. The online statistics website
w3counter.com conducted a monthly poll of browser marketshare and reported that
during the entire year of 2015, the top three most used web browsers available for
the Microsoft Windows OS were Google Chrome, Microsoft Internet Explorer/Edge,
and Mozilla Firefox (W3Counter, 2016). Being as these three browsers accounted
for approximately 60% to 70% of all browsers used, including Safari which is a
browser exclusive to the Macintosh OS, they served as the three common web
browsers with built in private browsing modes used in this study (W3Counter,
2016).

3.5.3 Tool Selection
Of the tools tested by NIST, EnCase and FTK were among the most well
known industry standards, used widely by law enforcement agencies and in
academia (Data, 2015) (Software, 2015). As these are enterprise solutions that
have been widely used by industry and government agencies, they were ideal for this
reserach, however only FTK was available in the Purdue University Cyber Forensics
laboratory. An open source program similar to FTK and EnCase called Autopsy
was used in the place of EnCase, as it was a free, but similar program to FTK and
EnCase. FTK Imager was used in this methodology to create .e01 image files of
each VM following the data population process. FTK Imager can produce image
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files of various types including raw image files (typically ending in a .001 file
extension) and EnCase image files (.e01). This methodology used the EnCase image
file type because it is supported by both FTK and Autopsy. Ultimately, this
research methodology looked to employ a similar test methodology for the collection
of browser artifacts as in the study done by Ohana and Shashidhar (2013), who
conducted a forensic analysis on private browsing modes of Internet Explorer,
Chrome, Firefox, and Safari. Although the research methodology and intended
research outcomes varied slightly in scope and purpose from Ohana and
Shashidhar’s study, by using FTK, and Autopsy in the place of EnCase, a
preliminary comparison could have been made between the outcomes of Ohana and
Shashidhar’s research and the reserach taking place in this study with regards to
common web browsers in private browsing mode. As a source of validity, upon
similar results, a basis of confidence can be established with regard to the process of
collecting and recovering browser artifacts from each browser. Where this research
differentiated from Ohana and Shashidhar’s work, and all the other research
reviewed for that matter, was the future steps and end goal of comparison of the
results to identify and determine if enhanced privacy web browsers provided better
privacy than the common web browsers using private browsing mode.

3.5.4 Data Population
The data population process for this research included visiting web sites,
creating bookmarks, submitting credentials to websites that required username and
passwords, searching terms, sending emails and instant messages, and viewing
videos and images for the purpose of simulating common types of web traffic. For
research purposes, this data population method was designed to create browser
artifacts that, in a real investigation, may have revealed context of user browser
usage. For this data population process, ten websites were selected from a list of the
top 500 most viewed sites in the United States as ranked in an 2015 Alexa poll.
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Alexa is an Internet-based company owned by Amazon.com that provides
subscription-based web analytics and digital marketing tool services (Alexa, 2016).
Due to the number of websites on this list, the sites used were all selected from the
top 20, and were choosen to produce specific browser artifacts data. Table 3.2
contains a list of the web sites used, browser artifact types, and which artifacts were
expected to be created from each web site as a result of the data population process.
The browser artifacts used in this methodology were selected as they provide a vast
amount of information about the browsing habits of the user and are typically
stored in the browser application folder, making them relatively easy to locate.

Table 3.2:
Artifact Relationships
Web Site Used

History

Cookies

Bookmarks

Credentials Searches Cache URLs

Google.com

X

X

X

X

Facebook.com

X

X

X

X

X

Youtube.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Amazon.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Wikipedia.org

X

X

X

X

X

X

Yahoo.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

Twitter.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

Instagram.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

Imgur.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

Ebay.com

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Pic/Vid IM
X

Email
X

X
X

X

X

Note. X = Content expected to be created for the website/artifact combination.

The additional tables listed all account information and content searched for,
viewed, sent, and submitted in the data population process:
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Table 3.3:
Data Population Content
Search Terms

Email Text

Instant Message Text

Bookmark

1

Golf

Email1

Message1

www.google.com

2

Baseball

Email2

Message2

www.facebook.com

3

Bowling

Email3

Message3

www.youtube.com

4

Tennis

Email4

Messages4

www.amazon.com

5

Football

Email5

Message5

www.wikipedia.com

6

Hockey

Email6

Message6

www.yahoo.com

7

Cycling

Email7

Messages7

www.twitter.com

8

Soccer

Email8

Message8

www.instagram.com

9

Running

Email9

Message9

www.imgur.com

10

Lacrosse

Email10

Message10

www.ebay.com

Table 3.4 lists the user credentials that were created prior to conducting data
population process.

Table 3.4:
User Account Credentials
Website

Username

Password

1

Google

thesistest0001@gmail.com

G00glePswd

2

Facebook

thesistest0001@gmail.com

F@cebookPswd

3

Youtube

thesistest0001@gmail.com

G00glePswd

4

Amazon

thesistest0001@gmail.com

Am@zonPswd

5

Wikipedia

thesistest0001

W1kiPswd

6

Yahoo

thesistest0001@yahoo.com

Y@hooPswd

7

Twitter

thesistest0001@yahoo.com

Tw1tterPswd

8

Instagram

thesistest0001

Inst@Pswd

9

Imgur

thesistest0001

1mgurPswd

10

Ebay

thesistest0001@yahoo.com

Eb@yPswd
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Below is the detailed process that was completed to populate each browser
with sample data. The videos, images, instant messages, and emails have no
significance other than to produce uniquely identifiable browser traffic. While not
imperative to this study, it should be noted that for each image and video viewed in
the benchmark trial, the same images and videos were viewed in each subsequent
trial.
• Launched VM
• Opened browser in private mode (for common browsers) or normal mode (for
enhanced privacy browsers).
• Opened 10 tabs and navigate to each URL from Table 3.2.
• Saved each URL as a bookmark.
• Logged into each website.
• Saved credentials in browser.
• Sent 10 emails betwen Google and Yahoo email accounts.
– All odd numbered messages were sent from Jon Doe (Google) account.
– All even numbered messages were sent from Jane Doe (Yahoo) account.
– **All emails were opened and read.
• Searched each search term in Youtube and played 30 seconds of each video.
• Searched 10 terms in with search engines as follows:
– Google:
∗ Golf
∗ Baseball
∗ Bowling
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∗ Tennis
∗ Football
– Yahoo:
∗ Hockey
∗ Cycling
∗ Soccer
∗ Running
∗ Lacrosse
• Sent 10 instant messages in Facebook chat.
– All odd numbered messages were sent from John Doe Facebook account.
– All even numbered messages were sent from Jaine Doe Facebook account.
– **Jaine Doe account is not listed in Table 3.4 but was required to receive
and send instant messages from the John Doe Facebook account.
• Closed the browser window to end the browser session.
• Saved and shut down VM.

3.5.5 Data Collection and Reporting
The data collection process required additional research to identify locations
within the file system where each artifact file was expected to be found. Due to each
image containing over 180,000 viewable items, data collection was limited as 132
trials in total were conducted. Once the artifact files and their locations were
identified, one baseline trial was run for each browser in each tool for a total of 12
baselines. Then, 10 trials were run of each browser in each tool, with only the
locations searched for in the baseline being searched in the trial as well. The trials
consisted of the image used for each baseline being analzyed 10 additional times by
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comparing the recoverable artifacts to those found in the baseline. This design
served as a test of test-retest reliability. The results of each trial were reported in a
matrix that kept track of what artifact files were found for each browser. Upon
collecting the data, each artifact received one of four possible classifications:
• XX = “Artifact found, content found”
• X = “Artifact found, no content found”
• X* = “Artifact found, required additional tool”
• “ - ” = “No artifact found”
Following data collection, counts and means were calculated for each
browser, per tool and browser to compare to each other using an Anova. Additional
qualitative analysis was conducted based solely on the data represented in the
matrix.

3.5.5.1. Browser Artifact Research

For each browser, additional research of published white papers and similar
published technical reports were examined for documentation of known locations
and file names for each browser’s artifacts. The findings were similar for each
browser. In the case of all of the browsers examined in this methodology, the
artfiact files were found in the browser’s application folder tree. Once the location
and name of each file was identified, the trial process occured. Below are a list of
the file names and locations that were searched for browser artifact files. Images,
videos, instant messages, and emails, unlike the other traffic were not stored in
database files in the browser application folder and therefore were searched for by
using FTK and Autopsy indexed images, videos, Internet chat, and email files.
Microsoft Edge. The locations, including file names or folder names for each
artifacts are listed below in Table 3.5. It should be noted that the data from Table
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3.5 is actually for the developmental pre-release version of Edge known as Project
Spartan. In the current version of Edge, artifacts are stored in the WebCache
database files, spartan.edb, as well as the WebCacheV01.dat file which was
consistent with the pre-release version. While the exact file path differed from the
table below with respect to the folders Project ID and Spartan, the general location
remained the same. FTK and Autopsy were capable of locating these database files
and indexing them as Internet files as well.

Table 3.5:
Artifact Locations of Edge
Artifact

Location

History

“/LocalAppData/Spartan/Database/WebCacheV01.dat”

Coookies

“/LocalAppData/packages/microsoft.windows.spartan {packageID}/AC/##!001/Spartan/Cookies”

Bookmarks

“LocalAppData/packages/microsoft.windows.spartan {packageID}/AC/Spartan/User/Default/Favorites”

Stored Credentials

“/LocalAppData/Spartan/Database/WebCacheV01.dat”

Search Terms

“/LocalAppData/Spartan/Database/WebCacheV01.dat”

Browser Cache

“/LocalAppData/packages/microsoft.windows.spartan {packageID}/AC/#!001/Spartan/Cache”

Typed URLs

“/LocalAppData/Spartan/Database/WebCacheV01.dat”

Viewed Images/Video

Search FTK/Autopsy

Instant Messages

Search FTK/Autopsy

Email

Search FTK/Autopsy
Note. Table data source: (Gratchoff & Kroon, 2015).

Google Chrome, Epic, and Comodo Dragon. Locations for browser artifact
data from the browsers Chrome, Epic, and Comodo Dragon were listed in this
section. Little to no published research was found for artifact storage of Epic and
Commodo Dragon. As such, artifacts in Epic and Commodo Dragon were searched
for in the same locations as Chrome. The reason for this was due to the similarity of
the three browsers. The similarity was the result of all three browsers being built on
the open-source Chromium browser platform (Comodo, 2016) (Epic, 2016). Since
each browser used the Chromium platform, they function and store data in similar
places and in similar fashions. The previous statement was confirmed by setting up
a test VM with Epic and Comodo Dragon installed, then the author navigated to
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the same file path as Chrome but for each browser’s folder in the place of Chrome.
This revealed many of the same database files and folders present in Chrome.

Table 3.6:
Artifact Locations of Chrome, Epic, and Comodo Dragon
Browser

Location

Chrome

C:/Users/Username/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/User Data/Default

Epic

C:/Users/Username/AppData/Local/Epic Privacy Browser/User Data/Default

Comodo Draggon

C:/Users/Username/AppData/Local/Comodo/Dragon/User Data/Default
Note. Table data source: (Akbal, Gunes, & Akbal, 2016).

Firefox. Locations for browser artifact data in Firefox was listed in this
section. Similar to Chrome, Epic, and Comodo Dragon, Firefox stored its artifacts
in a single folder within the user applications directory. As stated in an article on
browser forensics, Firefox stored artifacts in different locations, depending on the
OS, however for Microsoft Windows 7 and newer, they were stored in the location
listed in Table 3.7 (McQuaid, 2014). This folder, like that of Chrome, Epic, and
Comodo also contained several artifact database files.
Table 3.7:
Artifact Locations of Firefox

Browser
Firefox

Location
C:/Users/Username/AppData/Local/Mozilla/Profile/*.default/Cache
Note. Table data source: (McQuaid, 2014).

Dooble. Dooble browser, unlike the other five browsers in this study was not
well documented or at all for that matter. Unable to find any published work or
even blog postings regarding Dooble browser artifacts, the process of identifying
artifacts for Dooble was reliant on the tools to index files and identify any possible
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database files related to Internet usage and report them as an Internet file as done
with the other browsers. In addition, becuase it was unknown if Dooble used
another browser’s platform in the design and development process, similar to Epic
and Comodo Dragon with Chrome and Chromium, Dooble’s application data was
viewed for signs of artifacts. The location of Dooble’s application data was listed
below in Table 3.8.
Table 3.8:
Artifact Locations of Dooble

Browser
Firefox

Location
C:/Users/Username/AppData/Local/

3.6 Variables
For this study, the independent variables being tested were the web browsers
Epic Browser, Dooble, Comodo Dragon, Google Chrome, Firefox Mozilla, and
Microsoft Edge as well as the forensic analysis tools Forensic Toolkit and Autopsy.
Each browser served as an individual test, therefore the dependent variable being
observed and measured in each experiment was the artifacts recovered.

3.7 Summary
This chapter discussed in detail the study design, methodology, and
methodological components for this research. The focus of this methodology was
the process forgone to populate the browsers with data, find and identify artifact
files in known locations, discern the classification of each artifact file found (See
-Data Reporting- for classifications), and ultimiately conducted a qualitative and
quantitatve analysis of the reserach outcome.
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CHAPTER 4. RESULTS
This chapter described the results as found from the descriptive statistics for
the current study, discussed in the following sections: descriptive statistics,
hypothesis testing, and post hoc assessment. The section titled descriptive statistics
provided a narrative of the browser artifacts recovered by each browser-tool
combination in terms of both artifact type and counts recovered. The section that
followed, titled hypothesis testing specifically addressed the author’s hypothesis via
a conducted comparison of the relationships between browser type and artifacts
recovered. Finally, the post hoc analysis section compared the two tools tested in
this research to address and compare the effectiveness of each tool with respect to
browser artifact recovery.

4.1 Descriptive Staistics
The process of data collection artifact files were categorized into 1 of 3
groups: “Artifact Found - Content Found”, “Artifact Found - No Content Found”,
or “Artifact Found - Requires Tool”. This categorization dictated that if no artifact
file is found, the result would be “No Artifact Found”, however this category was not
included in the result matrix. Following the 10 trials of each browser, it was noted
that all ten trials produced the same artifact files for each given browser such that
there was no variance between the ten trials of a browser. For further clarification,
there was variance found between the number and type of recovered artifacts for
each of the six browsers but no variance was found between the ten trials of a given
browsers. Since there was no variance in the results of the ten trials for each browser
and tool combination, an ANOVA test to compare the means of each browser and
tool combination was a moot point and thus was not conducted. The lack of
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Table 4.1:
Browser Artifacts Recovered by Browser and Tool
Browser Type/Browser

Tool

History

Cookies

Bookmarks

Credentials Searches Cache URLs

Pic/Vid

IM

Emails

-

Common
Edge

Chrome

Firefox

FTK

XX

XX

XX

-

-

XX

-

XX

-

Autopsy

X*

XX

XX

-

-

X*

-

XX

-

-

FTK

XX

X

XX

X

X

-

-

-

-

-

Autopsy

X

X

XX

X

X

-

-

-

-

-

FTK

XX

X

XX

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Autopsy

X*

X

XX

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Enhanced
Epic

Comodo

Dooble

FTK

X

X*

XX

XX

X

XX

-

XX

-

Autopsy

X*

X*

X*

X*

-

X*

-

XX

-

-

FTK

XX

XX

XX

X

X

XX

-

-

-

-

Autopsy

X*

X*

XX

X*

-

-

-

-

-

-

FTK

XX

XX

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Autopsy

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

Note. XX = Artifact found, content found; X = Artifact found, no content found; X* = Artifact found, required additional tool

variance among the ten trials marked test-retest reliability of the tools. As a result,
analysis was conducted using the data collected and stated in the result matrix.
For this table, it is important to note that “X” represented a browser artifact
file that was recovered and included those that did not contain any data from the
known browser traffic or required another tool to read the artifact content. Strictly
spoken in terms of recovered artifact files, looking at the two groups of web
browsers, this table illustrated what kind of artifact files were recovered for each
browser and tool combination. As depicted in Table 4.1, both groups of browsers
produced several recoverable artifacts, with many commonly recovered artifacts like
history, cookies, and bookmarks. The table also showed the difference between the
tools and their ability to recover and view artifact files.
As the data in Table 4.1 illustrated, the difference between the number of
artifacts recovered in the common browser group and enhanced privacy browser
group differed by one at the most. Within the groups, there were browsers that
produced fewer artifact files than the others, in particular Firefox and Dooble for
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their respective groups. Firefox only produced three recoverable artifacts as
reported by both tools while Chrome and Edge produced five artifacts as reported
by both tools. Among the enhanced privacy browsers, Dooble produced two
artifacts as reported by FTK and none by Autopsy while Epic produced eight as
reported by FTK and seven by Autopsy; comparable to Comodo Dragon that
produced six as reported by FTK and four by Autopsy. It should be noted that the
number of recovered artifact files reported for each browser in the two previous
statements indicated the same artifact files were found in each trial. For example,
the same three artifact files were recovered in all ten trials for Firefox by each tool.
Table 4.2:
Artifact Count by Browser and Tool
Artifacts
Browser Type/Browser

Tool

Content No Content Requires Tool

Total

Common
Edge

FTK

5 (50)

0 (0)

0 (0)

5 (50)

Autopsy

3 (30)

0 (0)

2 (20)

5 (50)
10 (50)

Subtotal
Chrome

8 (40)

0 (0)

2 (20)

FTK

2 (20)

3 (30)

0 (0)

5 (50)

Autopsy

1 (10)

4 (40)

0 (0)

5 (50)
10 (50)

Subtotal

3 (15)

7 (35)

0 (0)

FTK

2 (20)

1 (10)

0 (0)

3 (30)

Autopsy

1 (10)

1 (10)

1 (10)

3 (30)

Subtotal

3 (15)

2 (10)

1 (05)

6 (30)

Total

14 (23)

9 (15)

3 (05)

26 (43)

FTK

4 (40)

2 (20)

1 (10)

7 (70)

Autopsy

1 (10)

0 (0)

5 (50)

6 (60)

5 (50)

2 (20)

6 (60)

13 (65)

FTK

4 (40)

2 (20)

0 (0)

6 (60)

Autopsy

1 (10)

0 (0)

3 (30)

4 (40)

5 (50)

2 (20)

3 (30)

10 (50)
2 (20)

Firefox

Enhanced
Epic

Subtotal
Comodo

Subtotal
Dooble

FTK

2 (20)

0 (0)

0 (0)

Autopsy

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

0 (0)

Subtotal

2 (10)

0 (0)

0 (0)

2 (10)

Total

12 (20)

4 (06)

9 (15)

25 (41)

Note. Values represent frequency with percentages in parentheses.
Max count for browser/tool combination was 10, max count for subtotals was 20, and max count for
totals was 60.
The artifacts found were not always the same for both tools with each browser.
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To further refine the raw data into a table that provided better context for
the recovered artifacts, Table 4.2 listed each browser and tool however, instead of
listing each artifact file, this table listed the artifact and content category as a single
summed criteria. The three categories in this table describe three types of recovered
artifacts. “Artifacts with Contents” described those artifacts where the artifact file
was recovered by one of the tools and the tool was able to read the artifact and
render metadata or content for some of the generated traffic viewable. “Artifacts
without Content” described artifacts that were able to be recovered and read by the
tools but did not contain any metadata or content from the generated browser
traffic. “Artifact Requires Tool” described artifacts that were recovered by the tools
but required an additional tool to read the metadata contents of the generated
traffic. Examples of artifacts that requirde tools are some database artifacts such as
ESE or SQL databases. Browsers that used these databases included Edge, Epic,
Google (or Chromium variants), and Firefox, to name a few. While these may not
have always required additional software to read artifact contents, in the the case of
this experiment, there were at least 12 artifact files that required additional tools.
Analysis of this table showed an important difference between the two groups
that was not as apparent as in Table 4.1. Based on totals alone, the enhnaced
privacy browsers produced one fewer recoverable artifact in total than the common
web browsers. The major differences occured in the number of recovered artifacts
that did not contain content versus those recoverable artifacts that required
additional tools to view content. The common browsers produced a total of nine
artifacts that were viewable but did not contain content from the generated web
traffic, this compared to the enhanced browsers that produced a total of four
artifacts that did not contain and content from the generated web traffic. In terms
of recovered artifacts that required additional tools to be viewed, the common
browsers only produced three of these while the enhanced browsers produced nine.
This research did not further investigate tools to view the artifacts that were not
viewable in FTK or Autopsy.
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4.2 Hypothesis Testing
The hypothesis posed by the author at the beginning of this experiment
stated the enhanced privacy browsers would produce fewer recoverable artifacts
than the common web browsers in private browsing mode. Taken into consideration
the qualitative and quantitaive data in Tables 4.1 and 4.2, the two groups produced
different numbers of artifacts, with the common web browsers producing one more
artifact than the enhanced privacy web browsers. Table 4.1 showed that the
maxium number of artifacts found, given the browser and tool combinations within
the groups of common and enhanced privacy browsers was 60. Comparing frequency
and percentages, the common browsers produced a total of 26 artifacts out of a
possible 60, while the enhanced privacy browsers produced 25 out of a possible 60.
The percentage of artifacts produced by the common browsers was 43.3% compared
to the enhanced browsers at 41.6%. The difference between the frequencies and
percentages was small and thus not significant, attributed to potential small sources
of tool or experimental error. As such, based on the data found in Tables 4.1 and
4.2, the author failed to accept the hypothesis on the basis that although the data
present showed the enhanced privacy browsers produced fewer artifacts than the
common browsers, the difference was not significant.

4.3 Post Hoc Assessment
Additional analysis was conducted for the tools used in this research. In
terms of tool effectiveness, Table 4.2 illustrated that FTK recovered the same
number of artifacts or more than Autopsy for every browser. In addition, in cases
where FTK and Autopsy recovered artifacts belonging to multiple classifications,
FTK produced more viewable artifacts with content or more artifacts that at least
did not require additional tools to view the content. In terms of effectiveness by
browser type, both tools proved more effective at producing recoverable artifacts for
the common web browsers where they combined to produce 24 viewable artifacts
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compared to only 16 for the enhanced privacy browsers. Where FTK was about as
equally effective for each browser type producing 13 viewable artifacts from the
common web browsers and 14 for the enhanced privacy browsers, Autopsy was five
times more effective on common browsers than enhanced privacy browsers, having
produced 10 viewable artifacts from the common browsers it only produced two for
enhnaced privacy browsers. In total, FTK produced more than double the number
of viewable browser artifacts in comparison to Autopsy, with a total count of 27-12
in favor of FTK. Based on these findings, FTK was the better tool for recovering
and viewing browser artifacts in the case of every browser in this study.

4.4 Summary
This chapter reported the results of the data collection and data processing
procedure as outlined in the methodology of this research. Results were reported in
three sections, Descriptive Statistics, Hypothesis Testing, and Post Hoc Assessment.
In the section titled Descriptive Statistics, Table 4.1 reported which artifacts were
recovered by each browser and tool combination and classified each artifact found as
having contained browser content, contained no browser content, or required
another tool to view the artifact. Table 4.2 reported the frequencies and percentages
of artifacts found as well as artifacts classfied in one of the three categories in Table
4.1, both by browser and browser type. This data was compared in the section
titled Hypothesis Testing to detemine that the author failed to accept the
hypothesis posed for this research; that being enhanced privacy browsers produced
fewer artifacts than common web browsers using private browsing mode. Finally,
the Post Hoc Assessment section compared the results reported in Table 4.1 and 4.2
to report on the effectiveness of FTK and Autopsy, ultimately identifying FTK as
the more effective tool.
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION
The question this research sought to answer was whether enhanced privacy
web browsers provided better privacy than the private browsing mode of common
web browsers, in particular in the case of digital forensic investigations. In the
current study, there was not enough evidence to suggest that the enhanced privacy
browsers did indeed outperform the common browsers.
There exist privacy-minded individuals who prefer not to leave traces of
what they do on the interent on their computer. The main concern being that
someone else may be able to access information about where one went to on the
Internet, what they did, and potentially, who they were in communication with
(G. Gao, 2015). For those who sympathize with this rhetoric, this research is
relevent to identify what types or specific browsers provide the best user privacy.
The opposite side of this discussion bore a distinct significance to law enforcement
and technicial specialists responsibile for conducting forensic analysis to solve crime
or conduct incident response. Often times, these security or forensic professionals
are looking for data that an individual attempted to hide. For these individuals,
having an understanding of tools and methods to obtain browser data from these
types of browsers, as well as an understanding of what is expected to be found may
help improve quality and accuracy of data analysis.
This study was modeled after the study conducted by Ohana and Shashidhar
in which they analyzed the private browsing modes of the web browsers Chrome,
Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Safari to investigate what artifacts, if any, were
recoverable (2013). While their study was similar to this research, it was not the
only study that investigated the effectiveness or private browsing. Studies by
Noorulla (2014), Marrington et al. (2012), Said et al. (2011), Mahendrakar et al.
(2012), and Ruiz et al.(2015) all investigated private session browsing for one reason
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or another. In all these studies, artifacts were recovered typically either by
analyzing a RAM dump or by actually analyzing the file system of a virual machine
in tools like EnCase or FTK. Focusing on the E-discovery phase of the investigation,
these studies sought to try to recover artifacts to see if it was possible.
This study, which had findings consistent with these previous studies,
progressed these previous studies to not only see if it were possible to recover
artifacts but to take it one step further by introducing three browsers that are not
widely used but are said to provide better security with the goal of testing them to
compare against the findings of these previous studies. While many of the studies
discussed used memory dumps, this methodology yielded lots of viewable artifacts
by simply conducting a file system analysis of the VM. Ultimately this study failed
to compare to previous studies becuase this study was an extension of these
previous studies. It was well documented in all of these studies that browser
artifacts were able to be recovered. This study ventured beyond that to better
understand how common web browsers in private browsing mode compared to less
known browsers that were designed with better privacy in mind. What this study
found was that not only did all of the browsers analyzed by the author produce
recoverable artifacts, based on research completed by others, every other browser
analyzed produces recoverable artifacts as well. While this scenario is favorable for
investigators or law enforcement seeking to use this information for investigative
purposes, as Ruiz et al. (2015) states, claims of complete privacy by web browser
vendors is still not being delivered.
The toolset used in this research was selected to simulate the kind of forensic
investigation that would be common practice of a law enforcment investigation of
this sort. FTK and Autopsy provided complete file system analysis which is useful
because in most investigations, knowledge of what data exists and where on a
system is unknown prior to conducting the investigation. The studies mentioned in
the previous section employed a wide variety of tools from WinHex Dump and
Memory Parser to FTK and another commercial forensic software EnCase. The
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issue with immediately resorting to memory dumps is that it requires machine in
question be running that the time of discovery to conduct a memory dump. FTK
and Autopsy on the other hand provide the capability to do “dead forensics,” or
forensics on a machine that has already been powered down.
For this study, any tool such as FTK, EnCase, or Autopsy that can be used
to conduct a full analysis of the file system appeared to have been able to recover
some of the browser artifacts files. In this particular study, FTK and Autopsy were
successful in indentifying and recovering browser artifact files from common and
enhanced privacy web browsers. While FTK was in many ways more effective at
recovering viewable artifacts, the question still lingers; are browsers providing better
privacy or are the tools used to analyze browsers not able to find certain artifacts.
Based on the findings of this research and the previously reviewed studies, no
browser appears to be particularly effective at the prevention of artifact recovery.
For law enforcement or investigators involved with conducting digital
forensics investigations, the toolset plays a crucial role in the investigation. Based
solely on the evidence of this research, two tools were used however one clearly
outperformed the other. It came as no surprise that FTK outperformed Autopsy
primarily based on the fact that FTK is a commercial software and is well
supported by Access Data. Since EnCase could not be used in this research due to
the inavailability of a software license, it is not possible to determine whether
EnCase would have performed better than FTK however, in cases where a software
capable of analyzing the entire file system for browser artifacts is necessary, based
on this research, FTK is the most effective option.
For the privacy minded individual in search of a web browser that does not
render many browser artifacts recoverable, Firefox used in private browsing mode or
Dooble produced the fewest number of recoverable browser artifacts. Based
primarily on the findings of this study, browsers based on the Chromium platform
produced several viewable, recoverable artifacts as did Microsoft Edge. Factoring
those out, Firefox and Dooble were the browsers that provided the best privacy.
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Firefox, being a much more supported web browser provided a far more robust user
experience, however that is not to say a better browser does not exist. Dooble
ultimately produced the fewest number of recoverable browser artifacts however the
browser itself was not as well supported. In the process of data population,
anomolous errors proved disruptive to the user experience.
This study found that in the case of all six browsers, no artifacts were found
for typed URLs, instant messages, or emails. Referring back to the data population
process, there were emails sent between the Google gmail and Yahoo webmail
accounts. Facebook was used to send and receive instant massages as well. These
artifacts are of particular interest as they provide a great deal of information about
the intent of the user. Typed URLs could be included in web history, but not all
web history entries may be included in the Typed URLs list. What makes the typed
URLs so useful is that they show at least in some part, that the user intended to
visit a specific web page because they manually searched for it. In criminal cases,
this information could reveal intentional requests for web sites with illegal content
or information relevent to the case. Along with the typed URLs, the instant
messages and emails provide a wealth of knowledge about the user including who
they are in contact with and what is being said. Again, this information can be
valuable to criminal cases as it contributes to proof of intent. While the exact
reason these artifacts could not be found is unknown, potential causes could include
the lack of email artifacts since email as a service, including storage, is conducted
between email servers at remote locations, not the local machine itself . Therefore,
if emails are only viewed but never stored by the browser, it is possible that no
email artifact was created (Crocker, 2009). Additional causes as well as limitations
of the tools to identify, index, and read these artifacts. Although FTK and Autopsy
do have additonal processes that can be turned on during data processing to parse
email and chat data, they were not used in this study.
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5.1 Limitations
Limitations that placed a heavy burden upon this study were time,
availability of software, and knowledge of enhanced privacy browsers. The contraint
of time limited this research in scope, including number of browsers analyzed, tools
used to conduct analysis, and the depth of analysis. The time required to process
each trial was approximately two hours per trial, with 132 trials conducted for a
total of 264 hours. As such, the entire file system could not be analyzed for
artifacts. Each image file contained in excess of 180,000 viewable files or folders. As
such, only the documented locations where artifacts are known to be stored were
searched. Future research should expand upon the browsers tested as well as the
tools used to conduct analysis.
Perhaps the most influential limitation of this study was the available
documentation and research of the enhnaced privacy browsers. As stated in
methodology, the three enhanced privacy browsers had vary little to no
documentation or documented research, therefore the method of collecting artifact
data for them was based on research of similar browsers. As a result, it was possible
that additional artifacts did exist but were not found due to the tools or process
followed in this study. In the case of Epic and Comodo Dragon, analysis was based
on that of Chromium since they all share the Chromium platform. Dooble on the
otherhand was more difficult to identify, as the web page for Dooble itself did not
even contain technical informatoin. As such, Dooble was initially investigated as if
it were Chrome, Firefox, or Edge to identify if it shared a similar file structure to
any existing web browsers. Lack of absolute certainty as to the accuracy of what
artifact files to search for and where located was cause for speculation of the
accuracy of the Dooble browser results. Future research should include preliminary
studies of enhanced privacy and less common web browsers to more throroughly
understand and identify how and where browser artifactcs are stored.
Availability of forensic software placed an additional limitation on this study.
Commerical forensic software such as EnCase and X-Ways Forensics, both
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recognized and tested by NIST, as well as Magnet Forensic’s Internet Evidence
Finder are examples of tools that were well suited for this study (NIST, 2015a).
Costs ranging from several hundred to several thousand dollars per license would
have required additional funding to purchase license keys to impliment these
software packages in this study. As the tools played a vital role in this research,
with proper funding, future research should expand the toolset of this study to
include some of the tools mentioned above.

5.2 Conclusions
The research work conducted in this study examined two groups of web
browsers to investigate and identify recoverable web browser artifacts for the
purpose of identifying whether enhanced privacy web browsers provide better
privacy, defined by the number of recoverable artifacts as well as content, compared
to common web browsers used in private browsing mode. As some error or chance of
anomoly were accounted for with respect to tools and methodology, the author
concluded that a difference of one artifact was not strong enough evidence to
support the claim that enhanced web browsers produce fewer recoverable browser
artifacts. With respect to the reserach question posed for this reserach, whether or
not enhanced privacy web browsers provide better privacy was based upon whether
they produced fewer recoverable browser artifacts, especially artifacts that
contained content from previous browsing sessions. Based on the evidence found
and analysis conducted, this study did not produce suffiencient evidence to conclude
that enhanced privacy browsers do indeed provide better privacy.
In regards to the individual browsers, enough evidence was present to at
least suggest individual browsers that provided better privacy than their
counterparts. Among the common web browsers, Firefox produced the fewest
recoverable artifacts with only 3 artifacts recoverable by both tools. Similarly for
the enhanced privacy tools, Dooble performed the best, having only produced 2
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recoverable artifacts in FTK and none in Autopsy. Given the choice to use one
browser from group for better privacy, those two provided the best privacy. On the
opposite end of the spectrum, it was identified that the browsers that were based off
of Chromium, those being Chrome, Epic, and Comodo Dragon, produced five or
more artifacts in all browser-tool combinations except for one where four were
produced. As such, the author concluded that in general, browsers based off the
Chromium platform do not provide the best privacy compared to their competitors,
even when using private browsing modes.
The research conducted in this work, primarily with respect to the
methodology, bares a great deal of important to both the scientific community and
practitioner community. Contributions to the scientific community include
recognizing a need for more research with respect to less common web browsers that
claim to provide better privacy. This work also highlighted a need to test additional
tools for analysis to help determine which tools are most effect or if a new tool is
needed. Since this methodology was modeled in part after the process law
enforcement examiners follow, future research using this methodology should help to
bridge the gap between researchers and practitioners. For practitioners, this
research progressed in a similar process to provide a step-by-step guide in the case
that one of the browsers used in this work is encountered in a real case.
Looking beyond the research question, an evaluation of the effectiveness of
the tools used in this research, found that FTK recovered more artifacts in total
than Autopsy. While this difference in total number was small, a comparison of
recovered artifacts that were viewable by each tool supported that FTK was a much
more effective tool recovering 27 viewable artifacts compared to the 12 that Autopsy
produced. The others required an additional program for the content to be viewed.
This difference in performance lead the author to conclude that FTK was a much
more effective tool for conducting forensic investigations of private session browsing.
Future research should expand the list of browsers and tools used to conduct
the forensic analysis. With the proper funding, tools like EnCase and Internet
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Evidence Finder may prove more effective than FTK at identifying and viewing web
browser artifacts. This research methodology could also be applied to different
operating systems. With the increasing prevelance of Macintosh computers and
Linux distributions in the workplace, this would open the door to several web
browsers that are not compatible with Microsoft Windows such as Linux’s Iceweasel
browser.
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